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PROCRUSTEAN JURISPRUDENCE
SQUEEZING LEGAL PHILOSOPHY INTO AN ALREADY CROWDED
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
J. STANLEY MCQUADE
THE SAD CONDITION OF JURISPRUDENCE AND SomE HOPEFUL SIGNS
Legal philosophy has been on the back burner in American law
schools for some time. One could speculate and give many reasons
for this. In part, it may have been due to an unfavorable climate of
academic opinion, which generally does not see much benefit in
conceptual niceties. Or it may be that the traditional ways of teaching
the subject have seemed over-academic and unrelated to law practice.
Or it may simply be that the law school curriculum has become
overloaded; courses have to compete for space, and jurisprudence
has lost out in the struggle. But whatever the reason or reasons may
be, the bottom line is that legal philosophy is no longer considered
an essential foundation for legal studies. It is a required course in
only a very few schools, and mainly those with a religious affiliation.
For the remainder, it survives as an elective which attracts relatively
few students, and in some law schools it is not offered at all.' Even
in Britain, where the system of legal education is more favorable to
educational subjects, 2 two studies, ten years apart, show that while
the subject is still thriving, there has been some decline in the
perception of the importance of legal philosophy, and there is a
growing tendency to make it an elective subject.3
There are, however, a number of hopeful signs. For several decades
now there has been a general revival of interest in philosophy,
1. This general overview is based on a review of a large number of law school
catalogues (though by no means all of them) and also on information derived from
colleagues and friends who have taken Jurisprudence seminars as to the number of
students involved, which was commonly a dozen or less.
2. See footnote 15.
3. See Neil MacCormick, "The Democratic Intellect and the Law," 5 Legal
Studies (1985), pp. 172-82. The report immediately precedes Professor MacCormick's
article. Ibid., pp. 151-71.
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especially language philosophy, which has spilled over into legal
theory. One result of this has been a bumper crop of very able legal
philosophers whose writings have gained recognition both inside and
outside the legal profession. Educators, including legal educators,
have also begun to look more kindly on philosophy, and begun to
view it as in some way educational, promoting lateral thinking,
explaining the ideas which have produced our civilization and generally
broadening the point of view. Prestigious law schools have been
experimenting with required first year courses that could be more or
less described as legal philosophy.4 Particularly encouraging is the
fact that there appears to be a renewed interest in jurisprudence
among younger law teachers. A jurisprudence seminar in Philadelphia
organized by the American Association of Law Schools in 1986
attracted a very large audience, and a large number of those attending
were young law teachers who were considering teaching a course in
jurisprudence.5
NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND ASSOCIATED RISKS
The reasons for this increased interest in philosophy in general and
the philosophy of law in particular are not well established. The
climate of opinion at present seems indeed to generally favor
philosophers. After a long period in which their efforts were commonly
regarded as misplaced and largely useless (providing unverifiable
answers to pointless questions), their help is now being sought on all
sorts of matters, especially those plagued with conceptual confusion
or moral dilemmas. Philosophers are appearing on platforms at
symposia on difficult topics and are being asked to serve on committees
charged with the responsibility of making decisions in generally mind-
boggling circumstances. Legal philosophy may also have received
some help from the human and environmental rights controversies.
An increased awareness of the conceptual and moral complexities
involved in legal decision has made legal educators consider the
possibility that courses in legal philosophy might render emerging
lawyers more competent to deal with these difficult matters.
4. Some of these, e.g. the University of Chicago, used mainly law and economics
materials; the Columbia University experiment, with a new first year curriculum
conceived by Dean Benno Schmidt and implemented by his successor, Dean Black,
had an economics component but also included other topics. It had a mixed reception
from both faculty and students. See "Columbia Law's Rocky New Course."
Manhattan Lawyer (1990), p.6
5. Informal communication to me by Dean Susan Prager, then president of
AALS.
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Whatever the motivation, the fact that there is a new sense of the
importance of the subject is good news for those who teach it. But
despite the welcome possibility of new courses in jurisprudence being
introduced and perhaps even required, we would do well to be a
little uneasy. We are like the stand-in about to go on stage when the
star has called in sick. We have a great opportunity, but if we fail
we will neither easily nor soon get a second chance. Philosophy is
an abstruse and abstract business, and it is doubtful that legal
educators have any very precise notion as to its nature and its
benefits. A new emphasis or an increased emphasis on jurisprudence,
if it is indeed on the way, is likely to be only a trend. Those favoring
it are hoping that it will add something to legal education and
professional competence. If it does not appear to do so or for any
reason proves disappointing to students and administrators, it will
be relegated to the bench or even dropped from the roster. In plain
terms, this means that if we do not have a very clear idea of what
we are trying to do, and do not do it fairly well, the pressures of
competing subjects in an already crowded curriculum are likely to
push us into a back place in the law school scene-or out of the
picture altogether.
There are a number of things that need to be done:
(1) We need to clearly explain what we mean by philosophy and
legal philosophy, since even academics these days have very diverse
and vague notions about such things.(2) We need to lay out, as precisely as possible, the materials
and methods that we propose to use and indicate the knowledge
and skills that we expect to produce with them.
(3) Finally and most importantly, we must show how a sufficient
offering in legal philosophy can possibly be squeezed into the core
curriculum of law school.
Parts I and II will outline, and Part IV will explain more fully,
what I take to be a reasonable and defensible position on the nature
and the benefits of philosophy in general and legal philosophy in
particular. Part III, the discussion concerning materials and methods,
is essentially a description and evaluation of our jurisprudence program
in Campbell University which demonstrates that such a course can
be implemented without major curricular changes.
I. WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?
A. THE JOB DESCRIPTION OF A PHILOSOPHER
Jurisprudence being a brand of philosophy, we need to describe
what kinds of activities we have in mind when we speak of
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philosophizing in general and hopefully to indicate the benefits that
are likely to accrue from them. There are probably as many versions
of philosophy and philosophical method as there are philosophers;
yet in spite of this, one can provide a notion of philosophy and
philosophical method which commands wide if not universal agreement
and which is satisfactory for legal purposes. This is possible because
the European philosophical tradition has great common themes which
have already been major influences in the development of both the
common law and civil law systems.
The term philosophy originally meant any kind of systematic
enquiry whatever. Plato remarked that one who loved truth loved
every kind and variety of it.6 A philosopher then was simply anybody
who thought deeply and logically about anything. Even when the
depositum of knowledge became large and special branches of learning
became somewhat independent studies, this attitude continued to
persist. The various researchers still considered themselves philosophers
and simply added an adjective to show the kind of philosophy they
professed. Newton, for instance, called himself a natural philosopher,
not a physicist. 7
In the rising tide of scientific positivism, which became particularly
noticeable after the Darwinian controversy in the mid-nineteenth
century, all this changed. The term philosopher became suspect in
scientific circles, suggestive of armchair speculation, if not learned
ignorance. Scientists no longer described themselves as philosophers
and poured scorn on those who did.8 Philosophers were more or less
evicted from the field of scientific enquiry and left to dig in some
other field (if they could find one). The identity crisis of the modern
philosopher had begun.
6. Republic. 474A. Great Dialogues of Plato, (W.H.D. Rouse, trans. 1956), p.
274.
7. The full title of Isaac Newton's Principia was Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy (1934).
8. T.H. Huxley, during the debate in the Royal society for the advancement
of Science, in effect advised the Bishop of Oxford, and all like him, to refrain from
interfering in things that they were not qualified to discuss. Implied in this was a
profound suspicion of philosophy which can be seen in his remarks about Plato.
"Plato was the founder of all the vague and unsound thinking that have burdened
philosophy, deserting facts for possibilities, and then, after long and beautiful stories
of what might be, telling you he doesn't quite believe them himself." Leonard
Huxley, Life and Letters of Thomas H. Huxley (1900), p.4 5 1. He also quotes Sir
Henry Holland as saying, "in my opinion Plato was an ass, but don't tell anyone
I said so."
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B. VARIOUS SOLUTIONS TO THE IDENTITY CRISIS IN PHILOSOPHY
Modern philosophers have sought to identify their function in three
main ways:
(1) Falling back on cartesian dualism. Descartes concluded that
philosophy is the study of non-physical things (like the soul and
God) which are not observable and above all not measurable. 9
This rigid dichotomy between mind and body was extremely influ-
ential until well into the nineteenth century but it does not do
much for philosophers seeking their occupational identity. It is
not denying the greatness and importance of Descartes to say that
as a basic description of thinking and of the academic world, it
is more or less defunct. I would not mention it at all but for the
fact that some of its bones are still venerated 0 as precious relics.
(2) Philosophy can be viewed as considering the same topics as
science, but asking different questions about them. A philosophical
question may be defined in these terms as one that cannot be
answered by the usual scientific methods of observation and crucial
test. These odd questions are given equally odd names such as
metaquestions (like the old metaphysics) or second order questions
or parainvestigations. Typical examples would be "what" questions
such as "what is matter?" or "what is energy?" There are also
"how do we know?" questions such as "how do we know that
the features which make a theory reasonable are themselves rea-
sonable?" These cannot be answered by planning a course of
investigations or designing a critical experiment. In short they seem
altogether different from ordinary scientific questions. Unfortu-
nately they are so odd and so difficult to answer that the suspicion
9. Descartes distinguished sharply things known by the senses from those known
by the mind. The senses acquaint us with physical things or bodies, whose essence
is dimension and movement so that they are measurable. The business of science is
the measurement of bodies, and so it is essentially mathematical. The mind on the
other hand deals with immaterial things such as the mind or soul and God which
do not have dimensions, are not measurable and are understood by a platonic form
of reasoning, identifying necessarily true propositions or axioms and deducing
consequences from them. The cartesian approach became so widely accepted in
academic circles that psychology remained a part of the philosophy department in
many universities until comparatively recent times. With the development of statistical
mathematics, however, many previously non-dimensional things were reclassified as
being measurable so that psychology, sociology and political science made their
exodus from philosophy to find their proper place among the mathematical sciences.
Philosophy was left then with God and the more ghostly aspects of the soul, a
prospect which most philosophers have not found inviting and so have abandoned
it to seek their identity elsewhere. See esp. his letters to Princess Elizabeth in
Descartes' Philosophical Writings (Norman Kemp-Smith, ed. 1952), p.27 4.
10. For instance the notion that science consists of measurement, or as one of
my medical teachers put it, "if you don't got numbers, you don't got nuthin'."
This by the way is a nice example of the persistence, and therefore the importance,
of philosophical ideas.
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inevitably arises that they are improper questions, or pseudo-
questions, or at least questions we can get along very well without
asking.
(3) A third possibility is that the business of philosophy is pro-
viding a broad overall view of the universe or some segment of it
such as "man" or "the human environment," an activity com-
monly described as ontology (rather like the old description of
philosophy as "seeing things steadily and seeing them whole").
This approach has proved popular particularly in continental Eu-
rope and America. It is seen as filling in an important empty
space left by the science and technology concentration of modern
university education, which generally pays little attention to im-
portant questions about who we are and where we are headed.
And despite doubts and suspicions about its credentials, especially
on the part of language philosophers, a major branch of modern
philosophy, existentialism, proceeds along these lines.
While there is a good deal to be said for the notions that
philosophers are problem solvers or map makers, and most of them
nowadays are one or the other, all of these answers to the philosopher's
search for identity seem to me to be vague and unsatisfactory, and
for the same reason. All of them discuss the function of philosophy
by asking what is the proper "field" of philosophy, where
philosophers, and only philosophers, may work. We may do better
if we rephrase the question.
C. EXIT THE "FIELD" AND ENTER THE "JIG-SAW PUZZLE"
The simplest way to meet the concern of the philosophers that
they do not have a "field" like botanists or chemists, is to deny that
they need one. Academia on the field theory is like a great realm or
barony with major estates (the arts and sciences, etc.), which are in
turn carved up into smaller farms or allotments, the domains of
physics, law, psychology, etc., each of which has its own subject
matter and its own methods. This kind of arrangement may persist
as an administrative hangover from earlier times, but does not really
represent the way in which the faculty divide up their research and
teaching.
It might be better to take the analogy of a great jig-saw puzzle
with pieces strewn all over the floor of a room, or to imagine that
a huge machine from outer space has crashed and that its parts are
scattered across a football stadium. Various groups of people can be
imagined standing in different parts of the room (or stadium)
wondering how the pieces might all fit together. The intellectual
universe viewed in this way is a great mass of "data" which we
believe hangs together in some manner, though we are not sure how.
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Groups of researchers with common knowledge and skills are
congregated at different points where the materials and the problems
are of interest to them and where their approach holds promise of
producing results. But there is no absolute reason why someone
should not move around and work elsewhere. Researchers nowadays,
in fact, rarely have individual fields totally distinguishable from those
of their colleagues in other disciplines. People from different
departments tend to work together, borrowing ideas and techniques
from one another.
We should not then ask what is the particular and exclusive field
of the philosopher or anyone else, for no one has a fee simple in
academia; our tenure is at will, we are liable to be displaced at any
time by more promising tenants. We may define philosophy, then,
by identifying the kinds of questions that philosophers consider, and
justify it by showing how the work of philosophers contributes to
knowledge, and perhaps also by pointing out how it can be useful
to researchers and teachers in other disciplines, including law.
D. DEFINING PHILOSOPHY AS REFLECTIVE THINKING
Western philosophy began with people who were not content to
ask conventional or practical questions. Their initial questions, asking
"why do rivers run?", " why does water turn to ice?", "why are
some actions right while others are wrong?" and so on, no doubt
seemed as pointless and nonsensical to their contemporaries as the
concerns of contemporary philosophers do in our own day. But their
reflective spirit and their ability to view things from odd angles,
which is the very essence of philosophy, is vital in any scientific
enquiry, and there is no reason why a scientist should not feel
honored, like Newton, to be called a philosopher in this sense."But what are the special functions of the philosophical specialist
who studies and teaches in the Department of Philosophy, who is
not a reflective professional, but a professional reflector?
Reflection involves creative imagination, but should not be equated
with flights of fancy. It is indeed more like excavating than flying. 2
11. An interesting article on the nature and uses of Jurisprudence describes
philosophy as reflective imagination. Thomas D. Eisele, "The Activity of Being a
Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit of Implications and Possibilities," 54 Tenn. L.
Rev., p. 345.
12. The notion that Jurisprudence is digging rather than flying is well brought
out by Eisele: "The idea that jurisprudence courses are meant to be broadening
misconstrues what such a course can truly offer students, particularly students in a
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Thinking about one problem uncovers a deeper one and so on.
Anyone thinking about the basic concepts of their profession is
already digging and will soon be led down to questions and problems
which are common to several disciplines. Fruitful cross-fertilization
often takes place at this level when thoughtful people in different
disciplines discover that they have something in common, and ideas
and techniques begin to flow from one area of research into another.
The activities of the pure philosopher can be considered to lie at
a still deeper level. Thoughtful physicists, engineers, physiologists,
or psychologists are liable to uncover very general but legitimate
questions about basic terms and concepts that they work with in the
course of their business. They may wonder, for instance, about the
nature of mathematics. Or they may be confused by questions such
as "what is light?" or "what is energy?" or "what is mind?" At
this point, the thoughtful physicist or physiologist may begin to look
at works on the philosophy of mathematics or become interested in
the views of Descartes, Berkeley, or some other ardent soul who has
struggled with these abstract questions. The term Philosophy (with a
capital P) is particularly appropriate when reflection reaches basic
premisses common to all, or at any rate most, intellectual enterprises.
Some of the answers the Philosophers have proposed to reflective
questions and, more important still, some of the techniques and
doctrines that they have developed in the course of answering them,
have proven extremely useful to all sorts of professional researchers,
including legal theorists.
The usefulness of courses in philosophy to undergraduate students
follows from this definition of philosophy as reflection on underlying
premisses. Their value is not in broadening the mind or sharpening
the critical faculties. It lies, rather, in deepening our understanding
of the concepts and values that underlie literature and art, education,
political institutions- in short all human activities. Such understanding
of the roots and underpinnings of things is of value in itself, but it
also tends to be interpretative, to allow us to see literature, architecture,
professional school, who are trying to become professionals. The point of such a
course is not to broaden their experience so much as it is to deepen their experi-
ence. . . .A jurisprudence course can make their responses less superficial and ...
more insightful professionally. Thus jurisprudence proceeds not by introducing law
students to new or exotic ways of thought, but rather by bringing their attention
back to the problems and ways of the law, and asking them, challenging them,
demanding them, to give these problems and ways their complete attention. The
idea is one of penetration and immersion, not expansiveness or release." Ibid., p.
347.
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politics, education, and pretty well everything else in new ways and
to act accordingly. Philosophical ideas, therefore, tend to be most
important, arguably the most important, influences governing change
in any sphere of human activity. The fingerprints of Plato can still
be seen on everything from intelligence testing and education to
architecture.
Assuming some such idea of the function of philosophy and
philosophers we may go further and consider the notion of professional
philosophy, reflective thinking on the basic concepts underlying a
particular occupation or activity, which in our case is the study and
practice of law.
II. WHAT IS LEGAL PHILOSOPHY?
A. LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
The term jurisprudence was originally as comprehensive in law as
was its cousin "philosophy" in science. It was used to refer to any
body of organized law; no hard and fast distinction was drawn
between the study of particular legal matters, such as criminal law,
and the kind of wrestling with basic concepts that we might regard
as legal philosophizing. Austin, however, described foundational
thinking about the basic premisses of legal theory as general
jurisprudence or simply jurisprudence, and since that time, the term
jurisprudence (absent some qualifying term such as "medical" or
"criminal") has come to be synonymous with legal philosophy. The
terms legal philosophy and Jurisprudence (with a capital J) will
therefore now be used interchangeably here to refer to reflection by
the legal profession on basic notions and concepts underlying their
own business.
The term philosophy of law (not legal philosophy) is sometimes
used to refer to reflection on law for other than professional purposes.
Philosophers, theologians, economists, political scientists, and all
sorts of people have often included thoughts about law and definitions
of law in their systems. This kind of activity is sometimes called
outsider philosophizing about law as opposed to Jurisprudence, the
professional or insider study. Another way of saying the same thing
is to call the professional study foundational, reflecting on the
presuppositions and premisses which underlie legal practice, and to
describe the non-professional variety as relational, showing how law
fits into the general scheme of things or how it can be seen from
the perspective of other disciplines such as economics.
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Much ink has been spilled debating the merits of these various
ways of reflecting on law and their place in legal theory, 3 but there
is no reason why they should be ultimately opposed to one another,
for they are aspects or varieties of the same kind of activity. In
practice, each acts as a resource and stimulus for the other. The
foundational and professional study of law, the main emphasis here,
is likely to be stimulated and helped by ideas adapted from other
disciplines; in fact most creative changes in law have involved "foreign
imports" of one sort or another. 4 Jurisprudence, then, whether
insider and foundational or outsider and relational, is in essence the
understanding of law in depth and so should have its place in legal
education. It is unlikely, however, given the professional emphasis
of the American law school and the time constraints that this places
on the curriculum, that relational studies can make it in the core
curriculum. 5 It will be argued and hopefully demonstrated later that
foundational studies can be fitted in as required courses.
B. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE TO PROFESSIONAL LEGAL
COMPETENCE
The most obvious value of Jurisprudence is that it provides
understanding of law. Foundational studies emphasize the roots from
which law developed and which continue to nourish it. Relational
studies throw light on the law in another way, using ideas which it
shares with other enterprises. One cannot claim to really know law
without some appreciation of these roots and relationships. Academic
purists therefore regard this kind of understanding as a sufficient
justification for including Jurisprudence in the core curriculum, 6 but
13. A review of this controversy, and a continuation of it, can be found in John
Hurd, "Institutional Jurisprudence," 36 Am. J. Juris. (1991), p. 125.
14. The influence of platonic notions about reason and science on the develop-
ment of Roman law and medieval common law, the effects of radical empiricism
on Austin and the American legal realists, and the use of economic theory in the
present century are notable, but by no means the only, examples of this tendency.
15. The situation is quite different in British law schools, where professional
education is largely managed in law institutes following graduation from law school.
This arrangement frees up a good deal of time, especially in four year law schools
such as Queen's University, Belfast, my alma mater, where all sorts of relational
studies can be included in the core curriculum or at least encouraged by requiring
that one of a group of such electives be taken.
16. See Peter Mirfield, "In Defense of Modern Legal Positivism," 16 Fla. St.
U.L. Rev. (1989), p. 985. See p. 386 where Professor Mirfield argues that there is
probably no justification possible for legal philosophy other than that it aids
understanding. He does, however, go on to admit that theory and practice ultimately
contribute to one another.
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there are other justifications. Those who have taken Jurisprudence
courses have found them of value in practice, allowing them to view
particular legal problems from various viewpoints and to analyze and
explain complex conceptual matters in a lucid and succinct manner.
A Jurisprudence course, even an elementary one, will also provide
the ability to read and evaluate books containing philosophical ideas,
and important works in any professional field tend to be of this
type. However, the real importance of Jurisprudence lies in its ability
to provide direction and purpose to professional activities. At the
crossroads of life, individual lawyers and the profession as a whole
begin to wonder where they are going and, in response to these
concerns, must inevitably think-and think Jurisprudentially.
Jurisprudence is then to law what the art of navigation is to sailing,
and without it the law will be a "ship of fools.' ' 7 Unfortunately,
this kind of benefit is more easily seen after years in practice when
immediate professional objectives have been reached and reflection
is a more normal and natural process than it was in law school. But
if the beginning is not made in law school and the basic intellectual
tools for the job provided there, later reflection may not last very
long, nor get very far.
III. INCORPORATING JURISPRUDENCE INTO THE LAW SCHOOL
CURRICULUM
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LINK BETWEEN THEORY AND
PRACTICE
There is traditionally some resistance on the part of students and
even faculty to any proposal to introduce materials which do not
directly and immediately relate to professional practice.' 8 Most students
come to law school, medical school, etc. primarily in order to learn
how to function as lawyers, doctors, or whatever. This focus, while
it is a powerful incentive to study hard, is sometimes a bar to
education in depth. Students may wish primarily to learn rules and
techniques and how to handle immediate problems. Any other form
17. The reference here is to Plato's analogy of the ship, the original "ship of
fools." There was a navigator on board but the crew, totally ignorant of the art of
navigation, were unable to discern the knowledgeable from the ignorant and kept
electing the latter to the post of navigator. The point is that some knowledge of
Jurisprudence is essential for all lawyers, just as some knowledge of navigation was
needed for all crew members of the ship. See Republic Bk.VI. 486B-487B. Great
Dialogues of Plato, p. 286.
18. Legal educators have the impression that this tendency has been strongly
reinforced in the eighties, perhaps by the increasingly difficult job market.
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of enquiry is liable to get less than their full attention unless it can
be linked in some way to their future professional life.
Preoccupation with the professional and the practical on the part
of students is simply a fact of life nowadays from which we cannot
hope to escape. It can, however, be an ally as well as an enemy.
Showing the professional relevance of any materials will greatly
increase the energy and interest which the students will bestow on
them. And connecting up with this basic professional interest is
particularly important in any course not obviously related to practice.
Medical educators are aware of this and are usually careful to link
the more abstract subjects, such as pathology or epidemiology, to
clinical classes in "combined clinical courses." The old theoretical
courses in pharmacology (often called Materia Medica) have likewise
generally been restructured, given a clinical orientation and retitled
Therapeutics.
If law students are to enter the strange world of legal philosophy
(other than by their own election) it is equally important to tap their
clinical interest. The topics chosen in a Jurisprudence course, especially
the early ones, should somehow be shown to arise naturally when
some practical problem is being considered. How this should be
managed is another matter, and it may be difficult. If it is not done
at all, then the students (other than the enthusiastic few) will not
learn well. But if it can be accomplished to any degree, then even
the reluctant may be motivated to learn and perhaps become genuinely
interested. 19
B-. WHAT MATERIALS CAN BE COVERED IN THE LIMITED TIME
AVAILABLE?
There is a great deal to be said, given the time limits of the
American situation, for concentrating on the familiar topics which
19. In an unfavorable review of a set of American readings in philosophy
intended to show its relevance to legal problem solving a British scholar expresses
a contrary view:
I am almost tempted to say that the value of legal theory lies precisely in the
fact that it has no practical utility. Certainly its value does not lie in its capacity
to prepare students for the practice of law, even practice at the problem-solving
level. Rather, its value lies in that which it shares with, for example, theories
of history or literary criticism, namely its capacity to advance one's understand-
ing of the intellectual discipline which is its subject. ("In Defense of Modern
Legal Positivism," p. 985.)
This way of looking at legal philosophy is more defensible in Britain, where
training in the Institutes of Law bridges the gap between professional practice and
the education in law provided in the Universities. Yet even in Britain, the practicing
bar have for several decades been pressing for more relevance in law school studies.
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have traditionally been the standard fare in elementary Jurisprudence
courses. This kind of course has been much criticized as antiquated
and irrelevant, but everything depends on how the materials are
perceived and taught. The questions they raise are perennial and can
be shown to be very relevant to the contemporary understanding of
law.
The usual general questions relate to:
(1) The definition of law. The classical definitions of law can be
taught in a dreary and trivial manner, like hanging out shirts in
a row to see which one we might select to wear. But they are not
mere verbal formulae, laying down conventional meanings for
words; they are dynamic interpretative descriptions, invitations to
view law in a certain way. It is no accident that new definitions
of law have heralded radical changes in the way in which law was
written, taught, and practiced.
(2) The formal organization of a legal system. Discussion of legal
forms is the modern version of the old notion that the study of
law is and should be scientific. New understandings of formal
systems and their place in science should make this topic more
alive and relevant than it ever was. 20
(3) The nature of values and their place in legal theory. Lawyers
increasingly find themselves in a polyvalent world where there is
a constant clash of ideals and values. It is not surprising that they
are becoming very concerned about moral questions and ethical
theory; there has indeed been a great revival of interest in the old
doctrine of Natural Law.
(4) Specific legal doctrines which present conceptual problems.
Included here might be such topics as the doctrine of precedent
or the hierarchy of legal authorities or the canons for the inter-
pretation of statutes. It is not difficult to create interest in the
classical discussions of such doctrines since they are both theoret-
ically difficult 21 and practically important.
All of these items then can and should be shown to have relevance
for jurisprudence (small j) and therefore to be important for every
student of the law, not only those with a philosophical bent.
C. INTEGRATING JURISPRUDENCE INTO THE CORE CURRICULUM
When the School of Law was established at what was then Campbell
College 22 in 1977, one of its major premises was that legal training
20. I have discussed this topic at greater length in "Medieval Ratio and Modern
Formal Studies," 38 Am. J. Juris. (1993).
21. See the exchange between Professor J.L. Montrose, Mr. A.W.B., and Prof.
A.L. Goodhart in 20 Mod. L. Rev. (1957). Prof. Julius Stone has reviewed this
discussion and added his own comments in 22 Mod. L. Rev. (1959), p.597-620.
22. The College became a University in 1979, and the law school was named
the Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law in 1988.
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was incomplete without reflective thinking about law and legal concepts
and that Jurisprudence should therefore be a required course. Ideally
two courses were required, one in the first year to establish some
sort of foundation and another in the third year when students would
be in a better position to understand the materials and appreciate
their relation to the other subjects. But in a curriculum where 60%0
of the other courses were also required, we had to settle for a great
deal less, in fact a one hour course which is taken in the first semester
of the first year. One would think that very little could be accomplished
with such a tiny offering and one, moreover, which is given before
the students have very much acquaintance with the law. With careful
planning and execution, however, its effects can be maximized and
indeed made quite significant.
The course is taught two hours per week for seven weeks rather
than one hour a week throughout the semester. This arrangement is
intended to focus attention on it during that period and to improve
retention of materials between classes.
A class concerned with reflective thinking should obviously be
divided into as many sections as possible to allow interaction between
teacher and students, but only two sections with approximately fifty
students each was deemed feasible. It had been hoped that with the
improved facilities of our new building, a division into three or even
four classes would have been possible, but there were other problems
besides space, and the more ideal smaller class has not proved
practicable. The formal classes have therefore been supplemented by
seminars given by student teaching assistants who review the class
materials and answer questions. Teaching assistants will normally
have taken the Advanced Jurisprudence seminar and each of them
conducts two seminars a week with groups of approximately twelve
to fifteen students. The teaching assistants meet together with the
instructor and discuss the seminar topic for one hour each week and
are also supplied with teaching notes, both of which help to ensure
reasonable uniformity of approach. This has been a most valuable
part of the program, if the expressed response of the students and
the reports of the teaching assistants are to be believed. The teaching
assistants can generally understand the needs and difficulties of the
students much better than the instructor (standing more nearly in
their shoes) and are probably more ,readily believed than faculty
would be when they tell their group that the subject is of importance.
It is also very valuable for the teaching assistants who, like the rest
of us, learn a great deal more than they teach.23
23. 1 would like at this point to acknowledge my debt to my students, especially
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It is very helpful if the instructor also teaches some other first
year subject. The relevance of jurisprudential notions can then be
illustrated in classes in Torts, Contracts, or whatever. The application
of word calculus theory, for instance, a central theoretical notion in
our Jurisprudence course in Campbell, can easily be demonstrated
and seen in action during class. The instructor can devise, or have
the students create, algorithms representing the law of nuisance or
failure to warn or any other topic.
The cooperation of other faculty can similarly reinforce the ideas
taught in the course and indeed continue its effects over the students'
entire law school career. Concerted effort of this kind, however, is
difficult to obtain. Many if not most faculty'members have never
taken a course in legal philosophy, have little idea of what it is
about and very little notion of its importance. Two measures have
been tried here to overcome this problem:
(1) Several years ago our annual faculty retreat took the form
of a Jurisprudence course with sessions spread over several days,
conducted by Professor Kent Greenawalt of Columbia University.
All faculty attended most of the sessions and participation in
discussion was good. It is debatable, of course, to what extent, if
any, remedial measures such as this will make faculty in general
able and willing to indicate jurisprudential issues when they arise
in their classes. A more positive result may be possible in the
future when, hopefully, more of them will have been exposed to
Jurisprudence as students. Nevertheless, we felt it worthwhile to
make this attempt. It certainly did not hurt the program and
probably was helpful. At the very least it indicated that the Dean
and the curriculum committee were serious in their stated intention
to make the teaching of Jurisprudence an integral part of the
whole educational program.
(2) More immediately effective was organizing a single seminar
(one or two hours) where individual faculty members discussed a
problem case, Lon Fuller's Spelunkian Explorers, with a small
group (typically ten or twelve students). This was helpful in
showing how a difficult decision inevitably leads to consideration
of underlying ideas. It is probably even more useful in showing
faculty support for the Jurisprudence program.
(3) A third, and I think most effective measure, has been to
include some Jurisprudence materials in the orientation week for
first year students. The immediate exercise of learning to brief a
case (what is relevant and what is not) and determining what is
those who have taken the advanced seminar and have acted as teaching assistants
in the required elementary course. Their criticisms have almost invariably proved
well-founded and their suggested improvements in class materials have, again almost
invariably, been adopted and' proved most helpful.
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the holding in a case raises questions about "the rule in the case"
(which we have inherited from Austin) and the "significant facts
in the case" (left to us by Oliphant and the realists). The difficulties
involved in Austin's and Oliphant's approaches to these matters
are thus raised in advance and in relation to a very pressing
practical question for the entering students, namely making their
first attempts at briefing a case. We also use this occasion to
introduce them to legal logic in the form of word games since the
word-calculus version of deciding a case (mentioned in the next
section) can be adapted to provide a fairly simple and certainly a
more objective method of deciding what should be included in a
brief and what may be omitted. They are encouraged to ask what
little pieces of word logic are being applied or might be applied
in the case, which technical terms are in question, and which facts
might bring the case under these crucial words or exclude it from
them 24
D. DEVELOPING SPECIAL MATERIALS FOR A REQUIRED COURSE
There is no shortage of text books and even casebooks on legal
philosophy, but almost all of them appear to have been designed for
an elective course. As such, they presuppose an active interest in the
subject and probably some familiarity with background notions as
well. We quickly concluded that none of these were apt for our
purposes and that we must develop our own materials.
It is not difficult nowadays to put together and customize a set of
materials for any particular purpose. Items can be scanned or otherwise
saved into computer memory and fairly easily formatted,
supplemented, and generally edited until they are deemed suitable
for whatever course we have in mind. We made several attempts in
this direction but finally settled on a reasonably small book specifically
aimed at students who are neither familiar with philosophical materials
nor particularly interested in becoming so. The central feature of
this book was a collection of stories, plays, etc. intended to introduce
the topics and materials in an interesting and attention catching
manner. These included a paternity case against John Austin (the
father of English Jurisprudence) a "Greek" play entitled Oedipus
Lex, and a panel game in heaven called Name that Norm. The book
was therefore entitled "Jurisfiction." The fictions are followed by
24. 1 am grateful here for the imagination and effort of my colleague Professor
Richard Bowser, both for his inclusion of Jurisprudential materials in the orientation
courses and for his insight and help in producing them. Professor Bowser has also
included explanatory materials in basic legal history (the other instrument of legal
understanding) in the orientation instruction, which I think has also been very
helpful.
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classical readings in Jurisprudence with questions and comments
appended. Short essays explaining background concepts and theories
are also included.
The overall plan was six main sections allowing approximately two
or at the most three classes for each. The first three main sections
deal with the definition of law and the main readings here were
Savigny's, Vocation of our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence,
John Austin's Province of Jurisprudence Defined and Hermann
Oliphant's Return to Stare Decisis-all classics. Savigny's little treatise
was chosen because it shows how discussion of a practical problem,
in this case whether there should be a civil code or not, leads to
discussion of an underlying conceptual problem, namely the definition
of law. All of these, especially Austin, were rendered more user
friendly by abridgement, providing section headings and replacing
archaic terms with more readily understandable modern equivalents.
The final two main sections are devoted to value systems.
Utilitarianism and contractarianism are considered together as
prudential theories (i.e., based on the notion of rational self- interest)
and the final chapter was devoted to natural law theory. These
particular value theories were selected because all of them have
featured importantly in legal theory in the past and continue to do
so at present.25
The fourth chapter, concerning the formal organization of legal
materials, is central not only in position, but also in function. It is
used as the structural matrix around which all the other materials
and concepts can be arranged. The formal theory employed is an
adaptation of the later views of Ludwig Wittgenstein in which he
stresses the use of logical games in any kind of thinking but especially
scientific discourse. This approach to legal theory is most. appropriate
in the computer age and helps bring legal theory in line with
organizational methods used in other -learned professions. The
decisional algorithms (essentially word games) favored in medical
literature nowadays can be made over to represent both substantive
and procedural law. Wittgenstein's ideas can also be used to provide
a definition of law as word calculus games applied to disputes to
realize values; this in turn can be used to compare and contrast other
definitions of law. It shows how values and policies may be
25. It is interesting that Rawls' theory of justice was used to develop the health
services rationing scheme in the State of Oregon to avoid some of the problems of
the Canadian health system, which was based rather on Bentham's approach.
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incorporated into legal theory,26 provides a reasonable and workable
theory of stare decisis,27 and may even be used to explain difficult
legal terms such as "reasonably certain" and "dead."
We have been using Jurisfiction for a number of years, and I
think it has been largely successful as a means of making the course
more interesting and more intelligible. Most importantly it has made
it possible for "ordinary" law students, who have no previous
exposure to philosophy, to go on to take and profit from an advanced
course. A number of defects have emerged, however, which we are
attempting to correct.
(1) Students have consistently complained of difficulty in under-
standing the theories of non-legal philosophers mentioned in the
book and have suggested that short articles explaining their ideas
would be helpful. Brief explanatory notes on general philosophical
matters have therefore been appended to each chapter where
appropriate. We also plan to add brief notes (approximately one
or two pages in length) in the forthcoming version to deal with
contemporary jurisprudential topics such as the economics and law
and critical legal studies movements. 28
(2) We have also found that there are more readings included
than one can possibly discuss within the time limits of our course.
We have therefore (reluctantly) removed some of the supplemen-
tary readings, such as Holmes' The Path of the Law, that were
included in earlier versions of Jurisfiction but not reached in class.
We would like to widen the spectrum of readings, and so provide
the students with increased exposure to Jurisprudential literature
by supplementing the main readings with short extracts only, the
purple passages rather than entire articles. In this way a greater
variety of materials can be included in the reasonable expectation
that they will be read by the students.(3) Finally, the questions and comments require constant revision.
The general trend here has been to leave out the more fanciful
and academic items and concentrate on questions which bring out
26. Wittgenstein's dictum that a "rod is a lever used for a different purpose"
implies that failing to consider ends and goals (including values) renders language
meaningless (no rules without purposes). This simple point avoids much of the
confusion that has marked the long debate on "legal positivism" by showing exactly
how values, as ends and goals, function in legal discourse.
27. 1 have discussed the topic of law considered as ratio more fully in "Medieval
Ratio and Modern Formal Studies."
28. In general we deal with current controversies and the writings of contem-
porary legal philosophers in the advanced Jurisprudence seminars rather than in the
Elementary course. Undergraduate courses in legal philosophy are frequently centered
around contemporary writings, and this approach seems to work very well, but there
is usually a prerequisite philosophy course or two required in order to take these
courses, a condition which does not apply in law school. There is also usually more
time available for discussion.
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important features of the texts or show how the theory impinges
on practice. This is a wonderful place to introduce case law
material. We have already made some use of cases, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Goldston, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), where a battered
and brain damaged patient was terminated by the physicians after
four days on the ventilator. This allowed the defense to introduce
a philosophical question namely "when is a dead man dead?" We
plan to increase these offerings and would welcome news about
good cases from teachers in other schools.
The Campbell experience has been outlined in some length here
not because it is the only way or even the best way to organize a
required course in elementary Jurisprudence, but simply to show that
given the will there is a way.
IV. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION FOR LEGAL
THEORY
The emphasis thus far has been on the place of Jurisprudence in
the law school curriculum. Yet the principal argument for including
it as a required course in law school, namely that it is an essential
part of legal theory (jurisprudence with a small j) argues that it
affects the practice of law and so should be a matter for continued
concern on the part of the practicing bar. That this is not felt to be
the case is another hard fact of life and one that will be very difficult
to overcome. Significant change will not really begin until law schools
see the importance of this matter and take action accordingly. In the
meantime, however, a number of things can and should be done.
(1) The most important of these, it is submitted, is that the
attention of legal theorists should be directed to preparing and
publishing studies directly aimed at practical problems showing
how good theory can elucidate and resolve tangled legal questions.
Impressive philosophical treatises and heated controversies (blood-
less duels) carried on in learned journals have their uses in the
advancement of learning but do not fulfil our responsibility to the
profession as a whole.29
29. Our philosophical edifices should be open and attractive buildings, after the
manner of Plato, with open doors to encourage access, a simple floor plan so that
visitors do not get confused or lost, and many illustrative windows to admit light.
Unfortunately this style of writing has never been much in vogue with philosophers.
Jurisprudents too often take aim at their colleagues rather than writing for the
general legal reader, with the result that the emphasis is on attack and defense,
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(2) Another important Jurisprudential project would be to use
structural theory (formal theory) to improve legal analysis and
legal writing. We think and write on legal subjects without much
attention to considerations of logic (in the mathematical and formal
sense of that term). Every learned discipline must develop ways
to arrange its materials in proper form both for purposes of
analysis and also so that we may communicate our views and
findings to one another. Much of the criticism of legal formalism
(e.g. that it is rigid and unrelated to life) arises from misunder-
standing and sometimes even plain ignorance as to the nature and
function of logical form. Proper formal structure is no more
unrelated to life or resistant to social change than is language,
which as Wittgenstein has taught us necessarily involves logical
form. If we do not know how legal logic works or fail to keep
the logical apparatus of the law current, we should not blame
logic but ourselves for the bad results. And if we become more
active in this matter, we should find that good formal structures
would be as helpful in law as they have been in medicine and in
science generally.
(3) Finally, it is the responsibility of the legal community, as it
is of any other profession, to keep an eye on what is going on in
other disciplines in order to see if there is anything that can be
usefully incorporated into legal theory. This duty obviously de-
volves largely on those members of the bar, and there are quite a
lot of them, who have expertise in areas other than law, e.g.
economics, philosophy, medicine, computer studies, etc. If they
were encouraged to make materials from their field of expertise
available to lawyers in an understandable form, they might do so.
There might even be enough of these lateral-thought materials to
justify a journal (free-throwaway type) which would act as a forum
where such ideas might be made available to the practicing bar
rather than the academics only.
B. SOME CAVEATS ABOUT THE USEFULNESS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
A few things need to be said, by way of explanation at this point,
about the use of philosophical materials (or ideas from outside
especially the latter. Jurisprudential writings are commonly intellectual fortresses,
forbidding rather than inviting, difficult to access, and filled with dark passages
and spiral staircases if we do manage to gain entrance. Current works in legal
philosophy are thus usually very difficult to read and also presuppose that the
readers have some knowledge of the subject. Beginners, whether law students or
interested lawyers, are liable to be daunted and turned off if they are introduced
too early to contemporary writers. It is for this reason that I think that it is a
serious tactical error to use contemporary materials in the required course. They are
better reserved for the advanced seminar where even previously unphilosophical
students enjoy trying out the weapons they have acquired in the introductory course
and storming the battlements of these formidable strongholds. Students in the
elementary course should, of course, be made aware that there are important
contemporary jurisprudents and should know something, at least in outline, about
what they are saying.
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sources generally) in legal theory, especially in its professional forms.
(1) The effects of theory, especially when interpretative concepts
are brought into legal theory from outside, may be malign. Im-
ported ideas have a long history of producing ill and even cata-
strophic effects inside the host subject. Imperfectly understood
and improperly applied-and which of them are not in the begin-
ning-new ideas can be counterproductive and even destructive.
Eventually, however, most of them find their proper place and
their legitimate uses. We must look at the broad picture and
consider the long-term advantages. Philosophy does not always
enlighten any more than medicine always heals. But we would be
no wiser to adopt an unreflective, unphilosophical approach to
law than to abandon scientific medicine and let the treatment of
disease proceed empirically by trial and error.
(2) Similarly it should not be assumed that philosophical inves-
tigations will definitely answer all basic questions or resolve all
conceptual puzzles. One can indeed be confident that they will
not. Conceptual reflection eventually reaches levels that make the
most profound thinkers dizzy. To dig beyond a certain point is to
come up against a hard layer of unanswerable questions and
impossible paradoxes. It does not follow, however, that the effort
expended in philosophical reflection is wasted or that the project
is ultimately futile. Provisional answers and approximate formu-
lations can be produced which are reasonably satisfactory and
surely superior to dogmatic assumptions and unexamined covert
premisses.
(3) One may wonder how complex conceptual studies can possibly
be accommodated into legal scholarship much less legal education.
Philosophical texts are difficult to read. The arguments proceed
in a manner that must seem painfully slow and tortuous to the
outsider. It takes a great deal of concentration and much endurance
even for philosophers to follow these arguments through to the
end. But there is no need for everyone to read them. The law is
a corporate enterprise, a collegium in medieval terms, so that while
each member should have reflected on the conceptual foundations
of the law, everyone need not be a specialist in philosophy,
economics, or any other interpretative tool. The more abstract
studies can be delegated to scholars with special training and
particular knowledge. It is, of course, an important part of the
function of these persons, or some of them anyway, to interpret
specialized materials and present them to their less fortunate (or
more fortunate) colleagues in a usable form.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The sum and substance of what has been said already is that:
(1) There is presently a renewed interest in legal philosophy which
creates new opportunities but also some concerns about the ad-
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vancement of the study of Jurisprudence in the legal profession
as a whole and especially in legal education.
(2) We need to make it clear to the profession and to ourselves
what legal philosophy (Jurisprudence with a big J) is and what its
essential connection is with the study and practice of law.
(3) Legal philosophy is not a "field" separate from other sub-
jects, but an activity, reflecting upon and interpreting basic con-
cepts in the law.
(4) The very nature of Jurisprudence as basic legal theory des-
ignates it not as an interesting extra, but as an essential element
in the understanding of law. It would seem to follow, unless this
can be miraculously interwoven into the other courses, that studies
in legal philosophy should be part of the core curriculum in law
school.
(5) It is possible with careful planning and faculty cooperation
to include required courses in Jurisprudence without overloading
the curriculum. Indeed given faculty cooperation Jurisprudential
considerations can become a normal feature of every course in
law school.
(6) Reflective thinking and facility in the use of conceptual ma-
terials (such as formal and moral theory) are needed by lawyers
for several reasons, but especially to provide direction for the legal
profession. Trial academies, judicial academies, emerging inns of
court in the United States, and CLE providers should therefore
be considering what they might do to improve the competence of
their members in these directions. The emergence of court might
also consider the improvement of conceptual skills as well as those
of the courtroom and law office.(7) It is impossible for any one person to keep up with devel-
opments in other disciplines, but the profession as a whole can
keep reasonably well informed as to most things if we act together
in an organized way. Lawyers with philosophical training or ex-
pertise of some other sort should be encouraged to take complex
or abstruse materials from extralegal sources and translate them
into forms that will render them usable by the profession as a
whole.
The overall contention is that reflective thinking is as important
in law as it is elsewhere and that foundational thinking (Jurisprudence
as defined here) is critically important. And since Jurisprudential
competence is neither innate nor produced by the everyday practice
of law, it must be taught. This amounts to saying that a determined
effort should be made to incorporate Jurisprudence into the core
curriculum of every law school.
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